Description

October 1943 turned out to be the worst loss rate for 8th Air Force for the entire war. 2,145 B-17s and 303 B-24s had been dispatched on missions. 163 B-17s had been lost (lost rate 7.5991%) and 9 B-24s were lost (loss rate 2.9703%). These loss rates meant that the B-17 crews chances of completing a 25-mission tour was only 28.32%. The losses on the 10-Oct-43 mission to Munster of 30 aircraft, followed by the devastating losses of 60 aircraft on the Second Schweinfurt mission of 14-Oct-43, caused the the USAAF high command to re-think the whole theory that the bombers could effectively protect themselves without long range fighter escort and some even questioned the whole strategy of "daylight bombing." With the arrival of the 55FG with P-38 Lightnings at Nuthampstead on 14-Sep-43 and the achievement of operational status on 15-Oct-43, there was a least some optimism of USAAF high command the P-38 would stem the losses, even though it was not particularly suited for "mixing it up" with the Bf-109s and Fw-190's of the Luftwaffe. The 55th had been "cutting their teeth" all during the latter half of October 1943 and were now thought to be fully qualified to support another "big" bombing mission to Germany.

On 3-Nov-43, the 8th Air Force went back to attacking Germany with a vengeance. The 3-Nov-43 mission was an all-out dispatch of 438 B-17s and 117 B-24s to bomb the German port areas of Wilhelmshaven, Germany. The mission would also be supported by 333 P-47s providing penetration and withdrawal support and 45 P-38s which would go all the way to the target and back with the bombers.

The mission consisted of three elements. The first element was a combined "maximum effort" force of 217 B-17s from 1st Bomb Division that included: 91BG (24); 92BG (25); 303BG (23); 305BG (20); 306BG (25); 351BG (25); 379BG (24); 381BG (27); and 384BG (24) dispatched to Wilhelmahaven, Germany. 211 aircraft of this element were effective on the target. 6 aircraft (2.765% loss rate) Failed to Return (FTR) 48KIA 12POW. 31 aircraft were damaged. 11 airmen in aircraft that returned were Wounded in Action (WIA). The bomber gunners of this element claimed 20-3-23 on attacking German aircraft.

The second element was a combined "maximum effort" force of 221 B-17s from 3rd Bomb Division that included: 94BG (33); 95BG (27); 96BG (50); 100BG (26); 385BG (27); 388BG (30); and 390BG (28) dispatched to bomb Wilhelmshaven, Germany. 212 aircraft of this element were effective on the target. Only 1 aircraft Failed to Return (FTR) (0.045% loss rate) 8KIA 2POW. 11 aircraft were damaged. Only 1 airman in a returning aircraft was wounded. The bomber gunners in this element claim 1-0-1 of attacking German aircraft.

NOTE: 11 PFF B-17s from 485BG were interspersed in the 1BD and 2BD formations and used H2X radar to identify the target and assist the bombardiers to effectively determine "bombs away."

The third element was a combined "maximum effort" force of 117 B-24s from 2nd Bomb Division that included: 44BG (28); 93BG (28); 389BG (33); and 392BG (28) dispatched to bomb Wilhelmshaven, Germany. 105 aircraft were effective on the target. There were NO losses or claims in this element, but 5 aircraft were damaged.

Fighter support (cf. VIII FC FO-168) from the 45 P-38s dispatched claimed 3-5-5 of attacking enemy aircraft. The 333 P-47s accounted for another 11-0-2 of attacking enemy aircraft.

Consideration must be given to the fact that the bomber formations were not attacked by the massive fighter formations put up by the Luftwaffe against the attacks at Munster and Schweinfurt, and the penetration was not as deep as that at Schweinfurt. However, credit must be given to the fighters for keeping the Luftwaffe from the bomber formations. 2 of the B-17s that were lost were involved in mid-air collisions. 566 bombers were dispatched and only 7 were lost (1.236%) which is a vast improvement from the 7.559% loss rate experienced in October 1943. Their was some relief, at last, and a boost in morale that this air war could be won.